4 therefore provide a basis for jurisdictional choice in the US, albeit a narrow one. Under the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution, courts may assert jurisdiction over defendants who have had only "minimum contacts" with the state, so long as defendant directs enough action toward the forum to make it fair that the defendant be sued in that state. 4 Thus, for example, due process is satisfied where the defendant knows it is making sales in or otherwise directing sales activity into a state. 5 Although the test ensures that a defendant has fair notice that it will be subject to the state's law, firms that depend on national advertising and distribution systems have difficulty avoiding burdensome state laws. Nevertheless, firms have some ability to avoid burdensome state laws by avoiding even minimum contacts with the state, and this possibility helps to constrain states' ability to impose their laws on firms based in other states.
It is not clear, however, how actively firms must avoid contacts with states or what
constraints are imposed on a firm's ability to structure itself and its activities in order to avoid personal jurisdiction in a particular state. In two cases currently pending in the U.S. Supreme Court, state courts have interpreted their jurisdictional authority quite expansively by asserting personal jurisdiction over companies whose products ended up in the forum even though the defendant entity did not choose to sell any of its goods in the state. In 5 manufacturer of a recycling machine that injured a scrap metal worker in New Jersey. The manufacturer commissioned another company with the same name but otherwise independent to act as its exclusive U.S. distributor. The distributor sold the machine to the plaintiff's employer in New Jersey. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that it could be sued in New Jersey even if it did not purposely avail itself of a New Jersey market or was, as it claimed, unaware that its product was sold in the state. Instead, it was sufficient that defendant commissioned a distributor to market the product throughout the U.S. Defendant either "knew or reasonably should have known that its distribution scheme would make its products available to New Jersey consumers,"
and this availability created a strong presumption in favor of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 7 The New Jersey court's conclusion would prevent a company from attempting to shield itself from liability by simply outsourcing its distribution, but it does so in a way that makes it impossible for firms to avoid personal jurisdiction everywhere without strong control over all product distribution and steadfast avoidance of undesirable states.
On the same day that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nicastro, it also granted certiorari in Brown v. Meter, 8 a personal jurisdiction case originating from the state courts of North Carolina. Here subsidiaries of defendant Goodyear Tire. Co. manufactured tires that were sold in North Carolina. As in Nicastro, the manufacturers did not handle tire distribution in the U.S. Instead, they "used their Goodyear parent and affiliated companies to distribute the tires 7 201 N.J. at 79, 987 A.2d at 593. 6 they manufactured to the United States and North Carolina." 9 According to the North Carolina court, personal jurisdiction could be based on defendants' purposefully injecting their product into the stream of commerce without attempting to exclude North Carolina as a potential product market. 10 This decision would prevent companies from strategically organizing their manufacturing and distribution systems in order to avoid liability for injuries caused by the use of their products in a particular jurisdiction. Even if this goal makes sense, the North Carolina court achieves it in a way that sharply inhibits firms from controlling where they might be sued.
The tire that allegedly caused plaintiffs' injuries never entered the forum state of North Carolina, but was instead manufactured in Turkey and sold in France, where the fatal injury occurred. The North Carolina courts used the fact that some tires manufactured by defendant made their way into North Carolina in order to exercise general jurisdiction over the Turkish defendant. Under this ruling, the Turkish defendant must defend any lawsuit based on any claim in North Carolina courts.
A court's ability to reach a defendant's conduct based on local distribution by a separate, albeit affiliated, entity, broadly extends its reach. Combined with a court's broad power, discussed below, to apply local law, this frustrates a firm's jurisdictional choice. The U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari may be intended to discipline these exercises of state jurisdictional authority. In the meantime, this potential jurisdictional reach must trouble firms contemplating doing business that might involve any contact with the United States.
9 Id. at 386.
10 Id. at 391.
Jurisdictional choice and conflict of laws
Because states can broadly exercise personal jurisdiction over firms, parties often have no choice but to comply with a state's procedural litigation rules. At least in theory, however, parties might be able to avoid state substantive regulatory and liability rules because state conflicts of law rules sometimes direct a court to apply foreign substantive law. If conflicts of law rules are clear (i.e., the law of the place of sale or manufacture, or injury applies to product liability claims), parties may be able to fashion their conduct to avoid the application of undesirable laws.
Under the principle of party choice, discussed above, contracting parties could avoid undesirable laws by choosing more the laws of more favorable states in their contracts. Effective exit from undesirable laws requires that parties be permitted to determine which law will apply to their actions at formation of the contract. If instead jurisdictional choice is effectively made by plaintiffs at the time of suit by choosing the court, manufacturers and other potential defendants must comply with the laws of all states that could exercise jurisdiction over them.
We therefore distinguish consensual party choice (where parties specify the law to govern the contract ex ante at formation) from non-consensual state conflicts law (where the governing law is specified ex post at the time of trial). US courts have used several different approaches to resolve conflicts of law law issues.
Under each approach, courts focus on the state authority to regulate rather than on facilitating party choice or predictability. Unfortunately, U.S. law reflects a distinct trend away from relatively clear rules towards vague standards. This makes it much more difficult for parties to predict the governing law at the time they engage in the relevant conduct or transactions, and 8 therefore to choose where to locate their assets and activities based on this law. In addition, because the vague standards enhance a court's ability to apply the law of the forum state, they diminish the parties' ability to exit from undesirable state laws.
The traditional approach
Early U.S. conflicts decisions roughly reflect the vested rights or territorial approach clear why one law should apply to contract performance and another to contract validity, or which rules were contract (breach of warranty) and which tort (e.g., negligence), or what distinguished a procedural rule drawn from the forum and a substantive rule subject to the vested rights system, 18 the courts could, and indeed had to, make their own ad hoc judgments.
Judicially-crafted escape devices that enabled courts to reach desired results further hindered uniformity and thus the parties' ability to predict results. Most importantly, courts could refuse to apply a law of another state deemed contrary to the forum's "strong public policy," 19 but courts were left on their own to determine which policies seemed strong. Adding to these difficulties, the parties were helpless to avoid the uncertainties of the traditional approach courts could never develop a perfect system for choosing the applicable law. The more complicated, less predictable approaches that replaced the traditional approach plausibly create more harm than good for interstate and international commerce.
Instead of dumping the traditional approach, the courts might have developed a logical and internally consistent way of filling the inevitable gaps in the traditional approach, and at least narrowed the "public policy" escape hatch which undermined certainty and predictability. But the states that led the movement away from the traditional approach were uninterested in predictability, and, as large states with large internal markets (New York and California in the 1950's and 1960's), they likely felt unthreatened by commercial pressures to provide predictability. Put differently, the movement away from the traditional approach reflected U.S.
states' preference for conflicts rules that emphasized local political and regulatory interests over consistency, predictability, and party choice.
Interest analysis
Modern conflict of laws has been shaped significantly by Brainerd Currie, who proposed Currie recognized the possibility that more than one state might have an interest in regulating the matter. He proposed that courts resolve these "true" conflicts between multiple interested states by applying forum law and justified this conclusion by stating that legislatures and constituents expect courts to enforce local policies whenever they are implicated. Note that with this position on forum law, Currie effectively trumped the party choice principle. predictable system when predictability is just one of several relevant objectives. Not surprisingly, then, in practice this factor is largely ignored.
The basic problem with all of these judicial approaches to choice-of-law is that courts make the final decision without sufficient (or in some cases, any) discipline by rules that could cabin the exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, courts that tend to favor plaintiffs in fashioning substantive rules often have a similar incentive to use conflicts of law rules that enable them to apply these plaintiff-friendly laws, 37 and plaintiffs are quite adept at finding those fora. In short, choice-of-law rules in the U.S. fails to exploit the potential of the U.S.
federal system to enable parties to exit oppressive laws. The basic problem in all these cases is that neither the Court nor Congress cares enough about the allocation of authority across the states to give choice-of-law sustained attention. We now turn to the question of the extent to which parties can use choice-of-court and arbitration clauses to enhance their choices of governing law. As a result, there is a close connection between contractual selection of the court and the choice of the law to govern. Typically the key problem for potential defendants is that plaintiffs generally choose the court unilaterally by deciding where to sue. Firms can counteract plaintiffs' ability to choose the forum ex post by inserting choice-of-court clauses in their contracts which designate the state or federal court where the parties' disputes will be litigated. These clauses also operate as agreements to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the chosen court. Not surprisingly, a study of merger and acquisition agreements found that contracts choosing a particular law to govern the transaction are likely also to provide for resolution of the disputes in the same state's courts. 68
Perhaps the most important provision in the Second

Choice-of-court clauses
It might seem that parties would gain little from choice-of-court clauses that they do not get from choice-of-law clauses. If a party sues in a court other than the one the contract selects, the forum likely will recognize that if it enforces the choice-of-court clause then the chosen court will agree to apply its forum law. Thus, courts that are hostile to choice-of-law clauses would be 
Conclusion
In sum, the U.S. federal system offers significant potential for jurisdictional choice as a partial solution to misguided or inappropriate law. However, this system is not only an imperfect solution, but can itself be a source of bad law and runaway litigiousness. 
